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Examining Participatory Governance in a Devolving UK: insights from national parks 
policy development in Northern Ireland    
Abstract 
This paper provides a contemporary examination of policy making and participatory practice 
in the context of devolving governance in the UK.  The paper takes Northern Ireland as its 
focus and is particularly timely considering the context of devolved governance, the ongoing 
transition from conflict to relative peace and the potential for rejuvenating democracy 
through participatory governance.  The paper concentrates on one particular policy process, 
namely the attempted designation of a national park in the Mournes Area of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty (AONB).   A thematic analysis of qualitative data is drawn upon to analyse 
the structural factors that framed the policy making process and the role of power in 
determining how consultation processes were initiated, designed and undertaken.  Using 
Lukes’ model (1974; 2005) as an analytical framework, power is shown to manifest at 
multiple levels within the policy making process to influence policy outcomes.  The paper 
reveals how the persistence of a top-down approach to policy development combined with a 
highly parochial political outlook undermined attempts to designate a Mourne National Park.  
The paper concludes that, given the immaturity of recently devolved government in Northern 
Ireland, in this instance, the democratising intentions of devolved governance have not been 
met.  This has implications for Northern Ireland’s recent reform of public administration 
which devolves certain planning powers to local authority level, and the management of the 
internationally significant Mournes landscape. 
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Introduction 
National parks were designated in England and Wales throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century (under the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act).  
Despite recommendations since 1947, no national parks were designated in Scotland or 
Northern Ireland during this period due primarily to landowner opposition and political 
circumstances (Shoard, 1987; Bell and Stockdale, 2015a).  The prospect of national park 
designation gained renewed impetus in both regions following political devolution in 1999 
when the then UK government devolved specific powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.   
 
Changes in the fields of environmental and political governance provide the context within 
which a new national parks agenda emerged.  The notion that the process of governing 
society has undergone a conceptual shift from government to governance has been widely 
debated (Edwards, 2001; Goodwin, 2008; Lockwood, 2010; Davies, 2011; Stoker, 2011; 
Hall, 2011; Eagles et al., 2013).  In the UK, New Labour (1997) embraced a governance 
agenda as the drive for more participative modes of governing gained momentum over the 
course of the 1990s (Healey, 2006).  Decentralisation, through political devolution (1998-
1999) for the UK regions, provided an opportunity to engrain participatory processes in 
governing practice and enable more locally tailored policy development.   
 
National park designation emerged as one of the first policy agendas in the newly devolved 
regions of Scotland and Northern Ireland (Rettie, 2001; MNPWP, 2007).  Even prior to 
devolution (1999), Donald Dewar, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, declared his wish 
to designate Scottish national parks (The Scottish Office, 1997).  A preliminary national 
parks consultation across Scotland (February 1998) informed detailed national park proposals 
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(SNH, 1999).  In the first few months of the newly devolved Scottish Parliament a National 
Park Bill was consulted upon and debated before being passed as the National Parks 
(Scotland) Act 2000 (Rettie, 2001).  Site specific consultation was later employed to inform 
the designation of two national parks in Loch Lomond and the Trossachs (2003) and the 
Cairngorms (2004).  Meanwhile, an attempt to introduce Northern Ireland’s first national 
park in the Mournes Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) failed.  This research 
analyses the Mourne national park policy process to examine the practice of participatory 
governance in Northern Ireland in the early years of devolution.  The empirical analysis 
focusses on the initiation of the national parks agenda in 2002, before examining the formal 
consultation process undertaken between 1st September 2006 and 31st January 2007.  
Building on previous academic critiques of the Mournes policy process (Bell and Stockdale, 
2015a; 2015b; 2015c) the emphasis here is on an additional aspect; namely, the influence of 
wider structuring forces on participatory governance, in particular the role of power in 
framing how consultation processes were initiated, designed and undertaken.  These 
structural factors provide the vehicle for examining power in this paper and are explored 
under three overarching themes: initiating national parks policy, governance structures and 
setting of the agenda and the consultation process and government’s response.  The findings 
help to shed light on the likely success of Northern Ireland’s recent reform of public 
administration which devolved planning powers to new local councils (Knox, 2006). 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out in five parts.  In the first part, the governing context 
within which the new national parks agenda (post 1997) emerged in the UK is discussed.  In 
the second part, literature relating to public participation and partnerships is reviewed and a 
framework for analysing power outlined.  Part three provides the context for the Mournes 
case study and explains the methodology adopted (a qualitative case study approach).  The 
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fourth part empirically examines the three themes listed above.  In the final part, the key 
findings are reviewed and wider inferences are drawn about politics, power and decision 
making in the context of a devolving UK, specifically with regard to the most recent reform 
of public administration in Northern Ireland and prospects for the future management of 
Northern Ireland’s significant landscapes. 
Evolving Forms of Governing in the UK 
The traditional ‘Westminster model’ of Government and politics in the UK transmits 
legislative authority from the Crown through the UK Parliament, incorporating parliamentary 
sovereignty, accountability through elections and strong cabinet government (Rhodes, 1997).  
Therefore, ‘government’ implies national level processes and top-down managerial processes 
(Stoker, 1998).  The term ‘governance’ emerged during the 1980s to describe how local 
government authority was being compromised by the involvement of non-state actors in 
governing processes (Rhodes, 1996; Jessop, 1997; Stoker, 1998).  In the absence of a 
commonly agreed definition, governance is aptly referred to by Rhodes (1996: 652-653), as a 
term to describe the ‘new process of governing…or the new method by which society is 
governed’.  Governance is often associated with the involvement of non-state actors in the 
process of governing which is realised through partnerships and public participation (Eagles, 
2013; Griffin, 2012; Cornwall, 2002; Stoker, 1998).  The governance agenda came to 
prominence with the election of New Labour (1997) who promised democratic renewal 
through constitutional change and more participative forms of governing.   
 
Political devolution to the UK regions (1998-1999) potentially signalled the beginning of a 
new political culture aimed at a more inclusive, locally responsive, proximate and 
accountable form of politics (Mitchell, 2000; Adams and Robinson, 2002).  However, ‘there 
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was no parallel in Northern Ireland for the extensive debate in Scotland about how devolution 
might usher in a new, more democratic, political style’ (Wilford and Wilson, 2001: 6).  In 
Northern Ireland, devolution was essentially driven by a desire to end sectarian conflict.   
Amidst escalating civil conflict, from 1972 power was removed from local politicians and 
local government in Northern Ireland (Knox, 2012) as the region was ruled from Westminster 
(Direct Rule).  The Belfast Agreement (or Good Friday Agreement), signed in 1998, resulted 
in the return of some political powers to Northern Ireland in December 1999.  Following a 
series of setbacks and Northern Ireland Assembly suspensions, devolved government was 
finally secured in 2007 following the St. Andrew’s Agreement.  Economic, environmental 
and land use planning were amongst the legislative matters transferred to the devolved 
institutions.  Within a Northern Ireland context devolution has progressed a stage further with 
certain planning powers devolved from a central agency (Planning Service NI) to a new 
structure of local government in 2015.  
 
Fundamental to the notion of a shift from ‘government to governance’ is understanding how 
dominant a position the state adopts within the political process (Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000).  
While ‘governance tends to be associated with more informal, decentralised and pluralistic 
decision making structures’ (Griffin, 2012: 210), Davies (2011: 60) detected little evidence of 
governments devolving substantial power to governance networks.  Marsh et al. (2003: 332) 
caution:   
‘Politics may be characterised by plurality’ but it does not necessarily ‘reflect a 
pluralist power structure’ (cited in Griffin, 2012: 215). 
 
Participation and inclusion can confuse who has authority as decision making can become 
further removed from elected political structures (Skelcher, 2000; Gaventa, 2006).  Given this 
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accountability gap or ‘democratic deficit’ (Rhodes, 2000: 84) new forms of governing can 
work against the enhancement of democracy.  For example, Swyngedouw (2005) claimed 
that governance is mired by constraints on who is allowed to participate, opaque and diffuse 
representation and unclear lines of accountability.  Understanding the relationship and 
interactions between the state and civil society requires close attention to governance 
structures and appreciation of the diverse ways in which power can manifest during the 
governing process. 
 
Public Ponsultation, Partnerships and Power 
While participatory governance predates Labour’s constitutional change agenda, political 
devolution in the UK ‘provided an opportunity to institutionalise [participatory] techniques as 
legitimate means of developing policy’ (Thompson, 2003: 54).  This opportunity was even 
more relevant to Northern Ireland where citizen engagement within the political/ democratic 
process has traditionally been constrained (Wilford and Wilson, 2001; McAlister, 2010).  The 
erosion of local political accountability through ‘Direct Rule’ is said to have created a 
‘democratic void’ (McAlister, 2010: 544) or ‘democratic deficit’ (Wilford and Wilson, 2001: 
3; Wilford et al., 2003).  While it may be false to assume that ‘opportunities for participation 
were relatively non-existent during the period of direct rule’ (McAlister, 2010: 539) there do 
appear to have been fewer opportunities (relative to other parts of the UK) for civic society to 
influence the political process. The Northern Ireland Assembly Engagement Strategy (NIA, 
2010: 5) recognised that, due to Direct Rule, parliamentary engagement is a relatively new 
phenomenon for Northern Ireland with a ‘perceived disconnect between politics/democracy 
and the public’.   In this context, devolution and the creation of a regional Northern Ireland 
Assembly, offered an opportunity to deliver democratic renewal, through more proximate and 
locally responsive governing.  Examination of the Mournes national parks policy process 
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provides insights into the democratic integrity of governance practice in this post devolution 
era.  The emergence of a national parks agenda corresponded with a period of upheaval in 
terms of local government reorganisation in Northern Ireland.  A Review of Public 
Administration (RPA) was launched by the Northern Ireland Executive in 2002 to evaluate 
arrangements for public administration and make recommendations for more accountable and 
effective public service delivery (Colhoun, 2007).  However, implementation of RPA was a 
‘tortuous’ process dogged by sectarian politics (Knox, 2012: 119).  For example, an 
originally proposed seven council model was widely criticised for its potential to contribute 
to the ‘balkanisation’ of Northern Ireland through a regional East/West sectarian split 
(Birrell, 2008; Knox, 2008).  Meanwhile, the recommendation by the Independent 
Boundaries Commissioner to incorporate some districts into Belfast City Council sparked 
disagreement and ensuing deadlock between Northern Ireland’s two largest political parties, 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (Knox, 2012).  The nationalist Sinn Fein 
accused the DUP of attempting to gerrymander boundaries as proposed by the independent 
commissioner, out of fear of nationalist control of Belfast City Council (O'Hara, 2010).  
Eleven new super councils eventually became operational in April 2015 with local 
government (i.e. the super councils) assuming responsibility for the majority of key planning 
functions (which were previously administered centrally through Planning NI - formerly the 
Planning Service).  Through ‘community planning’ councils are required to genuinely engage 
communities and individuals to create a vision for their area and make more locally 
responsive decisions (Cave, 2012). 
 
Citizen engagement can depend on the compliance of actors with the ‘rules of engagement’ 
as set out by the public sector (Clegg, 1989; McAreavey, 2008; Taylor, 2003).  Public 
consultation can provide a mechanism for taking the ‘pulse of public opinion’ or become a 
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voice gathering exercise to ‘secure legitimacy for policies’ (tokenism) (Cornwall, 2004: 2).  
According to Shand and Arnberg (1996), public consultation is initiated from ‘the assumption 
that governments will decide’ (Bishop and Davis, 2002: 22).  This resonates with the 
thoughts of Arnstein (1969: 216 and 219): ‘it [consultation] offers no assurance that citizen 
concerns and ideas will be taken into account’.  While certain stakeholders are likely to be 
more powerful on particular issues, government often holds the ‘real’ power to determine the 
weight given to particular issues during policy making.   
 
Consultation should therefore be ‘predicated on an acceptance by policy makers that those 
being consulted have the capacity not only to comment, but to influence the final disposition 
of the policy’ (Bishop and Davis, 2002: 22).  In Northern Ireland, Murray (2010: 3) claims:  
‘citizen input is openly encouraged, [and] facilitated…but arguably behind the scenes 
the levers of cautious control are at work in steering policy agendas towards particular 
views of the public interest’.   
 
Elsewhere too, the degree to which public consultation outcomes fed through to inform 
policy decisions has also been questioned.  For example, the relationship between the 
consultation outcome and the design of the Cairngorms National Park (CNP) has been widely 
critiqued (Illsley and Richardson, 2004; Ferguson and Forster, 2005; Thompson, 2006; 
Rettie, 2010).  Key features of the Cairngorms National Park (CNP) were deemed to have 
been based less on the results of consultation and more on political bargaining between 
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), Local Authorities, District councillors and Scottish 
Ministers.  Rettie (2001) concluded that ultimate power rested with the ‘political arm of 
society’ in deciding critical aspects of the CNP (Rettie, 2010: 134-137), sharing the views of 
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Illsley and Richardson (2004: 237): ‘the consultation was merely an attempt to persuade 
participants of the legitimacy of a position predetermined by political considerations’.  
 
Given that the consultation process was conducted through a partnership structure (the 
Mourne National Park Working Party), it is necessary to review literature relating to the 
democratic credentials of partnerships.  Partnership working has become a fundamental 
component of UK national park management (UKANPA, 2010).  Even in the USA, the 
country that first introduced wilderness, state owned parks, ‘partnership parks’ have adopted 
public-private partnerships to guide management (Hamin, 2001: 124).  However, a critical 
literature has emerged in a variety of contexts concerning the apparent ‘fragile democratic 
legitimacy of partnerships’ (Sable, 1996: 96).  Notwithstanding the partnership approach 
adopted by the Cairngorms National Park Authority (CNPA), Stockdale and Barker (2009) 
detected low levels of community inclusion in the early years of national park designation.   
 
Moreover, government invitation to all stakeholders to participate will not necessarily lead to 
equal participation as the legitimacy of partnerships can be undermined by issues of power, 
representation, lack of accountability and resource differentials (Taylor, 2003; 2007).  First, 
the initiator of the partnership is afforded disproportionate influence in choosing who is 
invited to participate; accordingly, ‘an exercise of power is evident in the very construction of 
the partnership’ (Shortall, 2004: 117).   
 
Second, partnerships can suffer from an accountability gap as responsibility and power is 
transferred away from elected political structures to unelected partnership members 
(Skelcher, 2000).  While partnership board places are sometimes reserved for locally elected 
representatives, this practice varies considerably (Skelcher, 2000).  Furthermore, the 
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partnerships can contribute to the growing power base of particular actors (Shortall, 2004; 
Woods, 2005a) as individuals frequently occupy positions on several partnership boards 
(‘usual suspects’).  Additional issues emerge concerning whom representatives speak for and 
what interests they represent within the community (Derkzen and Bock, 2009).   
 
Third, resource differentials can determine the relative influence of partners (Taylor, 2007).  
While the control of resources and land traditionally afforded status, wealth and power to the 
landowning elite (Woods, 1997), the new system of rural governance has been said to give 
disproportionate influence to funders and partnership managers (Woods, 2005b).  According 
to Woods (2005b: 170), all modes of governing privilege certain voices over others and 
‘concentrate power in line with the distribution of valued resources’.  Given the potential for 
tension and power struggles between partnership members with disparate interests and 
agendas it is necessary to appreciate the influence of power within the partnership setting 
(Shortall, 2004; Derkzen et al., 2008; Derkzen and Bock, 2009).  Equally, the influence of 
power is likely to be evident within the consultation arena. 
 
In order to understand the diverse manifestations of power, Lukes’ (1974; 2005) three stage 
model of power, which builds on previous power studies, is adopted in this paper as a 
framework for guiding power analysis.  The first dimension, based on the work of Dahl 
(1957), focused on overt power examining observable behaviour and decision making.  The 
second dimension, centering on the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962), concentrated on 
covert power and the suppression of difficult issues through controlling the agenda.  
Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 6) claim that power can be exercised by ‘confining the scope of 
decision-making to relatively “safe” issues’ (cited in Lukes, 1974: 18).  Therefore as Barnes 
(1988) explains, power can be exercised without it being openly observable through conflict; 
11 
 
people may have the capacity to exert power but choose not to exercise it.  In a rural 
development context, McAreavey (2006: 100) witnessed power in the second dimension in 
the form of power tactics to influence and control the agenda and determine how, and 
whether, decisions are reached.  Furthermore, the second dimension of power was shown by 
Sturzager (2010) to limit new housing in the English countryside as the less powerful, 
typically those not on parish councils, were excluded from decision making processes, thus 
allowing powerful anti-development interests to dominate..   
 
Lukes (1974) proposed a third view of power claiming: ‘the most effective and insidious use 
of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place’ (p23).  In a rural 
governance context powerful actors not only have the potential to suppress involvement but 
they can shape the views of those who do participate (the powerless).  Typically the 
powerless can be unaware that their real interests are being threatened and therefore make no 
attempt to resist the powerful (latent aspect of power).  Sturzager (2010) and Sturzager and 
Shucksmith (2011) demonstrated how in particular localities in rural England the elite have 
succeeded in limiting new rural housing provision by embracing the dominant sustainability 
ideology to define what constitutes legitimate development.  As a result, the powerless (often 
those on lower incomes) were said to support the sustainability concept while being unaware 
that they are being disadvantaged by it (through limiting the availability of affordable 
housing).  
 
Lukes (2005) revisited and developed his view of third dimensional power, taking account of 
criticisms leveled at his thesis, particularly concerning the structural aspects of power (Isaac, 
1987; Hayward, 1998).  Lukes clarified his thoughts on the influence of structure: ‘social life 
can only be properly understood as an interplay of power and structure to make choices and 
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pursue strategies within given limits’ (2005: 69).  According to McAreavey (2008), Lukes’ 
(2005) view of power is appropriate for analysing power in rural development as it recognises 
individual power relations, framed within wider social structures.  McAreavey (2008: 48) 
stated:  
‘power is about individuals and groups having the means and the ability to achieve 
goals that further their interests, all in the context of this larger social system’.   
 
Lukes’ (2005) updated work recognises that individual action can be constrained or enabled 
by wider structuring forces (Isaac, 1987; Hayward, 1998), such as socio-political context, 
social hierarchy or participatory formats, which provides an ideal framework for examining 
power within governance structures and specifically the role of power in influencing the 
outcome of the Mourne national park policy process. 
 
Local Context and Methodology 
The empirical findings presented in this paper are drawn from qualitative data collected from 
a Northern Ireland case study, namely the proposal to designate the Mourne Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) as Northern Ireland’s first national park.  Before 
detailing the methodology employed an overview of the local Mourne context is provided.  
 
The Mournes is one of eight AONB’s in Northern Ireland.  The area is a highly contested 
landscape accommodating a plethora of competing land uses.  While the Mourne AONB is 
protected by a range of national, European and International designations, over 50,000 people 
inhabit the area (MNPWP, 2007).  The Mourne Trustees (Fourteen Trustee groups claim to 
legally own approximately 25,000 acres (Mourne Trustees, 2010), alongside the Water 
Service, the Forest Service and the National Trust, own large tracts of the High Mournes.  
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However, the entire area has a highly fractured land ownership pattern consisting of over 
1500 private farm holdings (53% of land in the Mournes is actively farmed) with an average 
farm size of 15 hectares (CAAN, 2007).  With the exception of government and National 
Trust owned land and a number of short Rights of Way (approximately 18 kilometres, with 
some permissive pathways (Mitchell, 1999)), public access to private land in the Mournes is 
de facto, granted by custom rather than legal right (CAAN, 2007).  Occupiers Liability is 
therefore a concern amongst some Mourne landowners and the way in which land has been 
held in families for several generations and in some instances acquired through paying off 
annuities (Bell and Stockdale, 2015c), has engrained a sense of parochialism and local 
defensiveness of private land ownership rights, which many perceive national park 
designation will erode.   
 
Traditional economies in the Mournes include agriculture, fishing, forestry and small scale 
quarrying, while the area has a rich recreational legacy.  With approximately 150,000 visitors 
per annum, tourism contributes significantly to local employment and business revenue 
(Buchanan and Partners Ltd. 2006).  In addition to localised management pressures arising 
from intense recreational use of the Mournes (for example, trampling, path erosion and 
malicious fires (MHT, 2011), quarrying, infrastructural developments, intensive farming and 
speculative one-off house building threaten the natural heritage of the area (MHT, 2007).  
The Mourne Heritage Trust (MHT), established in 1997, is an independent private charitable 
body which works in partnership with local stakeholders to provide for the management of 
the Mourne AONB.   However, the MHT possesses no statutory management powers and in 
comparison to other parts of the UK are poorly resourced and receive limited protection 
through the planning system.  In this context, the MHT revived the idea of a national park in 
1999, proposing a ‘celtic national park’ for the Mournes (Mitchell, 1999).   
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This paper examines the governance structures employed to progress national park policy in 
Northern Ireland, focussing primarily on the wider structural factors that framed the public 
consultation exercise in the Mourne AONB.  Stakeholder feedback from those involved in the 
consultation exercise (such as organisers, participants or observers) provided the primary data 
source.  Given the importance of ‘preparatory reading’ and ‘exploratory work’ prior to 
conducting interviews (May, 2001: 132), a range of documentary material was gathered and 
analysed. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were employed and interview candidates 
were identified from the initial documentary analysis and through referral (snowball 
sampling).  Several snowballs were initiated to ensure the interview profile did not comprise 
interviewees with one particular outlook or belief.   
 
All interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed.  Interview participants were 
offered confidentiality through a process of anonymity.  The identity of individuals involved 
in the research process (for the most part) remains confidential (most interviewees are 
referred to by their stakeholder grouping).  In certain circumstances, following consent from 
the individual, their identity has been revealed (in such instances interviewees have been 
referred to by name or organisation).   
 
21 interviews were conducted in the Mournes (2011/12) and the interview sample included: 
farmers and trustees (3), management body representatives (2), local residents (1), politicians 
(6), community representatives (1), government officials (2), business and tourism 
representatives (3), conservationists (2) and consultation facilitators (1).   
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Given the time lapse between the empirical research (2011/12) and the process (2002-2012) 
under investigation, it is acknowledged that memory recall was a potential weakness of the 
interview method.  Indeed, post consultation experiences had the potential to distort 
stakeholder perspectives of the original consultation process.  However, the opportunity to 
examine post-event stakeholder perspectives facilitated a longer-term assessment of the 
designation process.  For example, the time lapse between the public consultation and the 
interviews allowed a number of interviewees to speak openly, freely and on ‘reflection’, 
which facilitated deeper understanding of the consultation.  As Richards (1996: 200) sums 
up:  
‘the further from the events they [interviews] are [conducted], the less reliable the 
information, (though the more willing they may be to talk)’.   
 
Given that the research was concerned with structural and power aspects of the policy 
process, it was necessary to interview elites, such as those who had an influential role in 
setting the agenda and defining the parameters of the process (for example, politicians and 
government officials).  As Richards (1996: 199) explains:  
‘the whole notion of an elite, implies a group of individuals, who hold, or have held a 
privileged position in society and...are likely to have had more influence on political 
outcomes than general members of the public’.   
 
Elite interviews can potentially ‘shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are 
not clear from analysis of political outcomes, or of other primary sources’ (Tansey, 2009: 7).  
Conversely, the reliability of elite interview material can be undermined by interviewees who 
seek to slant their account of particular events (Tansey, 2009).  While elite actors provided 
critical sources of information on the events and processes under investigation, the array of 
research contacts included in the interview schedule represented a key strength of the 
research, as the empirical analysis was informed by a breadth of first-hand stakeholder 
insights. 
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The data was analysed thematically, following the phases set out by Braun and Clarke (2006).    
‘Active’ re-reading of transcripts informed the creation of codes.  Data analysis software 
package (NVivo9) assisted the reconstruction of the data set; some codes were merged and 
more focussed codes were defined.  An original 65 codes were organised into preliminary 
themes and following a period of reflection a series of overarching themes were confirmed.  
Three themes relating to structural aspects of the policy process are analysed in this paper: 
initiating national park policy; governance structures and agenda setting; and the consultation 
process and government response.  In each, the power dynamics between different 
stakeholders are examined using Lukes’ framework.    
 
Initiating National Parks Policy  
While the prospect of national park designation in Northern Ireland was quashed by financial 
constraints and other political priorities prior to devolution (Bell and Stockdale, 2015a), the 
Environment Minister (Dermot Nesbitt) in the new Northern Ireland Executive decided 
behind closed doors to progress a national park designation specifically in the Mournes 
(BBC, 2002):  
“His [Dermot Nesbitt’s] focus was not on should we designate a national park in 
Northern Ireland, it was we should designate a national park in the Mournes 
specifically.  So as officials we thought that’s fine but we can’t just proceed because 
you want one” (interview with former Department of the Environment Official).   
 
EUROPARC Consulting, commissioned by the Department of the Environment (DoE), 
concluded that the Mournes was the most appropriate location (Bungay et al., 2002), which 
according to a former DoE official, gave the Minister’s proposal some “credibility” and 
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justification.  Several stakeholders felt the debate should have been launched at a regional 
level (as in Scotland) to discuss the principle and merits of national parks for Northern 
Ireland (to inform draft primary legislation) and identify possible location(s).  In the absence 
of such discussion into the need for a Northern Irish national park and the most suitable 
location for it, stakeholders perceived the proposed Mourne national park as a ‘done deal’:  
“We were wrong in going only for a Mourne national park and localising it in that 
sense…he [the Minister] panicked the issue, was so positive and so definite that he 
was announcing the provision for a national park and that immediately created 
opposition, local farmers etc. felt that this was a done deal…” (Conservationist).   
 
The decision to proceed in the Mourne locality without public input or a regional level debate 
about the principle of national parks in Northern Ireland generated immediate opposition 
amongst some Mourne landowners.  This hampered the work of the Mourne National Park 
Working Party (MNPWP), a government appointed committee, who were tasked with 
undertaking a formal consultation process in the Mournes.  Furthermore, the temporary 
suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly (on 11th February 2002) was deemed to have 
further hindered progression of national parks policy, principally because it delayed the 
drafting of primary legislation.  
 
In contrast to Scotland where detailed proposals and legislation (the National Parks 
(Scotland) Act, 2000) were laid out prior to local consultation (SNH, 2001), the Mourne 
National Park consultation was launched in the absence of any up-to-date primary legislation.  
This legislative context directly influenced the level and form of stakeholder engagement 
during the policy process in the Mournes.  The stalling of primary legislation in Northern 
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Ireland gave Mourne landowners a window of opportunity to oppose and render a national 
park politically unworkable:  
“Government thought they were going to force this upon the people of the Mournes, 
but some landowners weren’t going to let that happen.  We were all aware from an 
early stage that the correct legislation didn’t exist so that bought people time in a way 
to start building opposition to make it a political nightmare” (Mourne farmer).   
 
This legislative vacuum, and accordingly lack of detailed information about what a national 
park would mean for local stakeholders, critically undermined the work of the MNPWP:  
“We were sent out there to answer questions we didn’t have an answer to ourselves 
which left us very much ‘hung out to dry’ because we couldn’t actually tell them [the 
public] anything” (MNPWP member).   
 
Notably, an absence of information around possible national park structures (eg. aims, 
management arrangements and planning functions) led to perceived, and at times irrational, 
fears which were allowed to fester and snowball perpetuating a ‘fear of the unknown’ (Bell 
and Stockdale, 2009: 317).  A farmer commented:  
“People in Thailand had rice fields taken off them and turned into golf courses for 
tourists you know, even though they were short of food…things like that were telling 
me national parks weren’t a good thing”.   
 
National park opponents were able to prey on this level of uncertainty and lack of detail about 
what a national park would mean in practice by supposedly spreading mistruths: “As many 
times as you reassured them they wouldn’t listen, they wanted to keep these fears floating 
about in order to build up their propaganda machine” (MNPWP member).  A number of 
19 
 
interviewees even felt that the local media was utilised by national park opponents to 
capitalise on this local uncertainty:  
“There was never adequate information laid out in the local press for people to 
understand what national park meant…the very vociferous minority kept submitting 
very negative articles and letters to the papers who kept publishing them…some of the 
things they were saying were ridiculous but how is an uninformed community 
supposed to know that” (MNPWP member).   
 
On one occasion the Mourne Observer (local newspaper) dedicated a three page spread 
almost entirely to the anti-national park cause. Figure 1 reproduces the headlines it contained, 
and notably only makes reference to possible economic benefits from designation. 
 
Figure 1 Headlines from the Mourne Observer 
 
Source: (Ramsden, 2012) 
 
A Mourne resident equated this significant media attention with significant opposition which 
fuelled personal doubt and uncertainty:  
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“Well you know there was something in the [Mourne] Observer every week so it was 
clear there was big opposition [to a national park] and it made me think, maybe this 
isn’t such a good thing for us”.  
 
While Woods (2010) demonstrated the influence of national news media in reproducing rural 
discourses and amplifying the impact of rural protests, the above quotes illustrate the role of 
local news media (namely the local newspaper) in shaping popular beliefs and local opinion.  
This has resonance with the third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005); the perpetuation of 
mistruths about the impacts of a possible land use designation could be interpreted as an 
attempt by powerful individuals (landowners and farmers) at the local level to manipulate the 
views of other actors.  The powerless fail to recognise the potential benefits and therefore 
choose to oppose designation in line with the interests of the powerful, even though these 
may be contradictory to their own real interests.  For example, national park designation may 
be in the real interests of some local stakeholders through new financial opportunities.  
Alternatively, national park induced house price inflation may limit the ability of young 
people to live in the area.  Not surprisingly, no interviewee admitted to intentionally 
disseminating mistruths or misinformation; however, regardless of whether fears were real, 
imagined or simply voiced to bolster an anti-national park campaign, the lack of information 
on national park structures and possible impacts/benefits meant people were unable to make 
an informed choice as to how national park might affect their real interests.  This atmosphere 
of uncertainty was an ideal breeding ground for national park opponents to gain power and 
influence the values and thoughts of an uninformed public.  
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Governance Structures and Setting of the Agenda 
The Mourne national park consultation was undertaken by a government appointed 
committee; the Mourne National Park Working Party (MNPWP), which was commissioned 
to ‘open up’ the national park debate and report local views. The MNPWP comprised a 
chairman (a former local District Councillor, who lives outside the proposed national park 
boundary, and appointed following public advertisement) and a range of statutory and non-
statutory actors nominated from a number of organisations and interests: recreational and 
sporting (1), environmental (7), tourism (1), business (1), farming and landowning (6), 
community (2), as well as local elected representatives (7) (MNPWP, 2007).   
 
Armed with the findings from various consultants’ reports (Buchanan, 2006; Annett and 
Scott, 2006; Mack et al., 2006) and three possible boundary options (Farmer and Martin, 
2005), the MNPWP conducted a formal consultation from 1st September 2006 until 31st 
January 2007.  The tensions which surfaced during the attempt to identify a possible Mourne 
National Park boundary represent a microcosm of the highly political and historically 
contentious issue of public administration and local government boundaries in Northern 
Ireland.  Bell and Stockdale (2015c) addressed this issue, demonstrating the added 
complexity of identifying a national park boundary in the Mournes, given the ongoing 
tensions over political control, power and representation within the reconfigured councils.   
 
The way in which government framed the public consultation was viewed by some as a 
government attempt to limit the debate to safe issues (power in the second dimension).  The 
excerpt from interview below is typical of several such comments on this and highlights that 
topics such as, is there a need for a national park and what is the level of support for it, were 
not placed on the consultation agenda:  
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“…They never asked for a show of hands to see how many were opposed to national 
park…that question was never asked…they were afraid of a resounding no” (National 
park opponent).  
  
A former DoE official explained that a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ discussion (about the designation of a 
national park) was not incorporated in the MNPWP agenda because the decision to designate 
a Mourne national park had already been made by the Minister.  This pre-determined 
Ministerial decision (covert power) influenced how DoE officials sought to frame the 
MNPWP agenda:  
“Nesbitt [the Minister] had decided to designate a Mourne national park, therefore 
the role of the MNPWP was to produce recommendations not discuss if there should 
be a national park...we felt we couldn’t go out there and do a piece of work which 
tested whether or not local people want it…” (MNPWP member).   
 
Indeed the process of assembling the MNPWP proved controversial from the outset.  
Initially, the largest landowner in the Mournes (Mourne Trustees) was not invited onto the 
membership of the MNPWP:   
“[the Mourne Trustees] Are the big stakeholder in this whole process; the people who 
were going to be most affected by a national park were not involved in the process 
initially…[the Mourne Trustees] should have been the people first consulted…it was 
only when the committee got up and running that one person within the committee 
pushed for [the Trustees] to be represented on it” (Mourne farmer). 
 
Meanwhile, the inclusion of two National Trust representatives on the MNPWP provoked 
suspicion amongst landowners and raised doubts relating to government’s ulterior motives.  
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Some perceived the National Trust's membership to be a signal of government’s true desire to 
nationalise the Mournes through national park designation.  In the absence of legislation 
detailing the type/form of national park to be introduced, unfounded speculation grew:  
“…There is a more sinister influence here.  When the committee was established the 
National Trust had two people on the Working Party…the allegation was made that 
the government wanted the National Trust to take over the Mournes, the same as the 
Lake District, to re-nationalise the mountains” (Mourne farmer).   
 
Trustee representation on the MNPWP was initially overlooked because their interests were 
deemed to be covered by farming representatives on the MNPWP (interview with DoE 
official).  However, the Mourne Trustees viewed their initial exclusion from the MNPWP as 
an attempt by government to engineer the composition of the MNPWP to ensure the ‘right 
people’ were appointed to secure what the Trustees perceived to be government’s preferred 
outcome (introducing a Mourne national park).   
 
A MNPWP member also claimed: “The committee [MNPWP], it was said by everyone 
everywhere, was completely unrepresentative”.  In common with evidence accrued from 
other critiques of rural partnerships (Shortall, 2004; Derkzen and Bock, 2009), the 
construction of the MNPWP became an exercise of power as government chose which 
interests to include.  These findings resonate with the thoughts of Cornwall (2004).  She cites 
the work of Alonso and Costa in a Brazilian context where government created spaces, 
comprising local elites, ‘served to disarm any potential local opposition and effectively empty 
the invited space of its political significance’ (Cornwall, 2004: 5).  Instead of minimising 
dissent and disarming opposition, this perceived government manipulation of the consultation 
process had the reverse effect, fuelling a vociferous opposition campaign.    
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The allegation that government attempted to fill the MNPWP with pro-national park actors 
and reduce conflict/avoid difficult issues within the partnership (potentially power in the 
second dimension) was strongly refuted by a former DoE official:  
“Absolutely not, we had some really difficult people on it…it was a genuine attempt to 
have an inclusive process…besides we asked the organisations to nominate 
individuals, we didn’t hand pick people”.   
 
It is plausible that government sought an honest, fair and broad representation of Mourne 
stakeholder interests.  It is also not inconceivable that, in pursuing a Mourne national park, 
government unwittingly failed to acknowledge the importance of including a major 
stakeholder group, such as the Mourne Trustees, who are legal owners of a significant 
proportion of the Mournes.   
   
At the request of the MNPWP chairman, the Mourne Trustees were ultimately awarded two 
nominees.  While a MNPWP member felt the strong representation of local people meant 
“the community saw us [MNPWP] as one of them”, others felt particular local stakeholders 
jeopardised the integrity of the MNPWP.  For example the inclusion of the Mourne Heritage 
Trust, who in 1999 suggested the Mournes as a national park:    
“They’re [the Mourne Heritage Trust] the ones who wanted the national park in the 
first place, so how can it be independent if those who want it are helping run the 
meetings?”  (Mourne farmer). 
In addition, farmer’s views of the MNPWP were tainted following a radio interview with the 
chairman of the MNPWP in which he openly reported his support for a Mournes national 
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park.  This severely undermined the MNPWP’s public image as an independent or neutral 
body:  
“The consultation was flawed from day one because it wasn’t independent; the 
chairman…came out [in a radio interview] and said he was all in favour of a national 
park” (Mourne farmer).   
 
As outlined in the formal consultation report, comments regarding the integrity of the 
MNPWP were explicitly raised during public meetings (Inform Communications, 2008: 183-
184).  A locally elected councillor claimed:  
“I do not believe that [the chairman] and [anonymous] are independent members of 
the Working Party [MNPWP]” (Local councillor). 
A Mourne resident also expressed concerns over whether or not the MNPWP report would 
provide an accurate account of the consultation process and public opinion:  
“I have concerns over [the chairman] submitting the consultation report and feel that 
a consultative body should produce it” (Mourne resident).    
 
These statements demonstrate the sense of distrust within elements of the local community.  
Some individuals did not trust certain MNPWP members to put aside their vested or personal 
interests to act and make decisions for the greater good.  Accordingly, in the minds of some, 
the legitimacy and democratic integrity of the consultation process was tainted by the make-
up of the MNPWP and by prior rivalries between local stakeholders.  The Mourne resident 
above seems to suggest that an outside body using independent facilitators may have been 
better placed to cut through local communal politics to provide a more open and transparent 
account of public opinion.  However, such a body could have been accused of lacking local 
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knowledge or understanding.  In the eyes of some, a statutory agency may have been a more 
legitimate option for conducting the consultation.   
 
Examining the internal dynamics of the MNPWP revealed the challenge of reconciling 
competing stakeholder interests within a partnership structure.  Prior stakeholder rivalries 
amongst MNPWP members directly influenced stakeholder relations:  
“…throughout all the meetings it was [anonymous MNPWP member] trying to make 
his own name, it was another status seeking thing” (MNPWP member).   
Achieving a consensus between MNPWP members with disparate interests and entrenched 
positions was also difficult as members of the MNPWP acknowledged:  
“we all had very fixed positions from the start...there were those of us on the Working 
Party who had a wider ideal of national parks and saw them as something 
desirable...then those local representatives…largely to the farming community, were 
adamant that there will never be a national park in the Mournes, which made it so 
very difficult to agree on anything” (MNPWP member).   
 
This same MNPWP member deemed the MNPWP “a nonsense; it created division, it created 
argument and at no time within the three years of discussions did we ever agree a national 
park or not…”, and another MNPWP member detected “a total split within the Working 
Party” which was highlighted by the resignation of two members in the final stages of the 
process (see below).   
 
The polarised position of MNPWP members suggests that, contrary to the claims of some, the 
MNPWP was not solely comprised of national park sympathisers.  However, the potential for 
partnerships to privilege certain voices and give disproportionate influence and power to 
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partnership managers (Woods, 2005b) was evident.  During public meetings, MNPWP 
members sat at a top table and answered questions from the audience (confirmed at 
interview).  One MNPWP member viewed this format of public meeting as giving power to 
the Chair and recalled:  
“The dominant partner was the chairman…every meeting [he] would take over the 
whole meeting, he would answer all the questions and only brought in the members of 
the panel he saw fit…the very first meeting just ended up in a terrible row between the 
chairman and the public”.   
 
Another interviewee alleged that the MNPWP chairman had attended secret meetings with 
stakeholder groups “behind closed doors” without any other members present.  Whether 
these claims were true or not, it further demonstrates the lack of trust and level of suspicion 
amongst MNPWP members themselves.  Meanwhile, another stakeholder – the Mourne 
Trustees – represented on the MNPWP were dissatisfied that their nominees were not invited 
by the chairman to join a MNPWP delegation to the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DARD) to discuss farming issues (Mourne Trustees, 2010).  Once again, the 
chairman appeared to exert significant influence and power in determining the relative 
involvement and influence of individual MNPWP members, and accordingly specific 
stakeholder interests.  
 
Regardless of government’s intentions, power was exercised in the second dimension (Lukes, 
2005).  The power of the initiator (Shortall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006), in this case government, in 
determining the make-up of the MNPWP was interpreted by some as a deliberate attempt to 
populate the MNPWP with stakeholders who were sympathetic to a government agenda.  In 
reality it was impossible to determine the validity of such claims.  The opposing views of 
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MNPWP members suggested that members held differing views and a former DoE official 
suggested the exclusion of the Mourne Trustees may have been an honest oversight by 
government.  Whether their initial exclusion was attributable to an illegitimate exercise of 
government power or insufficient (or lack of) stakeholder mapping, it was a major flaw to 
exclude the Trustees from the outset.  As a result, the eventual Trustee inclusion in the 
MNPWP was shrouded in suspicion and fear concerning their future control of the area.  In 
accordance with the thoughts of Healey (2006), the findings suggest that traditional ways of 
working operated below the camouflage of collaboration which influenced who got listened 
to and who shaped the policy. 
 
The Consultation Process and Government’s Response 
The design or format of the MNPWP consultation was set by government and the 
independent consultation facilitators, and in effect restricted the public consultation process 
to public meetings.  This went against a more varied format preferred by the MNPWP itself: 
“We [the MNPWP] decided to hold workshops and surgeries but the Department 
[government] brought in one of these PR companies and they said hold public 
meetings.  We told them we don’t agree with this but the Department said no, these 
experts say hold a big public meeting” (MNPWP member).   
 
Just as Taylor (2000: 2023) noted ‘the pressures to conform to a pre-determined official 
template’ in urban partnerships, the independent facilitator of the Mournes consultation felt 
that the format options for the consultation process were curtailed solely by government (not 
government and the facilitator as suggested by the MNPWP member above):  
“I wouldn’t like to suggest that I did what I was told but at the time, there was a kind 
of accepted way that these things were done which involved public meetings, sectoral 
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meetings, people putting their views in writing and we were working within that kind 
of framework...from day one, there was already a thought process of what the 
consultation may look like”.   
 
This is perhaps reflective of the accepted format for conducting consultations in Northern 
Ireland: “It tends to be done very traditionally, I don’t think there is much more consultation 
than the basics” (DoE official).  The apparent terms set out by government, by which the 
consultation was bound, were further reflected upon by a MNPWP member: “Oh they 
[government] were all powerful because they produced all the funding for it”.  According to 
some, the attempt by government to hand over responsibility for designing the consultation to 
a partnership of local representatives was constrained by the institutional norms and practices 
of government at the time which resulted in a narrow range of consultation methods being 
employed.  A resulting over-reliance on traditional consultation mechanisms (such as public 
meetings) limited effective engagement, gave a platform to vested interests, fuelled conflict 
and intimidation (Bell and Stockdale, 2015c) and ultimately undermined the government’s 
ability to take forward a controversial policy agenda in the Mournes.  The findings raise 
doubts over how committed government were to assessing broad public opinion and whether 
there was a genuine attempt to incorporate community desires in the formulation of national 
parks policy.  
 
The potential for conflict between opposing interests with individual agendas was apparent 
through an inability by MNPWP members to agree a final consultation report.  The nominees 
of the Mourne Trustees (MNPWP members) felt their interpretation of the local views vented 
during the consultation process differed ‘so significantly’ to those being put forward in the 
consultation report, that they should submit their own minority report (Mourne Trustees, 
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2010).  The Trustees claimed that the MNPWP report gave undue weight to the views of 
vested interest groups and MNPWP members and failed to give adequate expression to public 
views.  The Trustees were particularly incensed that the MNPWP report underplayed the 
strength of the opposition to a national park and any new management arrangements.  As the 
consultation report neared completion, the Trustees’ request to submit a minority report was 
refused by the chairman of the MNPWP.  Accordingly, the articulation of local interests was 
constrained by micro-level power differentials.  Deeming their position untenable, the 
Trustees’ nominees resigned from the MNPWP, choosing to submit an independent report to 
‘better reflect’ the views heard (Mourne Trustees, 2010: 3-4).  
 
Whether the interests of the Mourne Trustees were actually marginalised more than any other 
stakeholder grouping is difficult to judge.  It was apparent from the Trustee's report that they 
felt, as legal providers of access to much of the high Mournes, they should have the 
overriding say on future management of the area: ‘only the Mourne Trustees and the 
beneficial owners have the right to determine what can take place on their lands’ (Mourne 
Trustees, 2010: para 4.13).  Therefore any partnership structure aimed at facilitating broad 
stakeholder involvement, or consultation report providing a balanced summary of stakeholder 
views, was always likely to be contested by the Trustees.  This example highlights the 
inevitability that not all preferences can be met through consultation and governance 
partnerships.   
 
Submission of the MNPWP report (2007) was followed by a period of political inaction.  A 
DoE press release (DoE, 2007) stated that the Environment Minister would consult with other 
inter-governmental agencies on the MNPWP recommendations.  MNPWP members were 
bewildered that their hard work had been met with such an abject response:  
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“Foster [Environment Minister] was fairly dismissive of it [the report], she didn’t 
show a lot of interest.  I was disappointed that we didn’t get an official report to tell 
us where things stood one way or the other” (MNPWP member).   
 
Indeed, several interviewees interpreted this as demonstrating a hesitancy by the Minister 
(and therefore government) to further the national park agenda because of local opposition 
and discontent.  The following interview excerpts perceived government’s inaction after 
receiving the MNPWP report to have stemmed from a nervousness about how to respond to a 
vociferous local ‘anti-national park’ stance (Community representative and former DoE 
official) and an inexperienced devolved institution with politicians concerned about how its 
response might affect future electoral outcomes (MNPWP member and Conservationist):  
“The devolved Ministers [became] much more nervous about the vocal local 
voice…they were very sensitive to the local lobby” (Community representative).   
 
“By that stage the full weight of the no lobby was known…and it would be fair to say 
the Minister got cold feet” (Former DoE official).  
 
“In essence what you have is an Assembly bedding down with local politicians under 
pressure from local pressure groups and concerned about their vote” (MNPWP 
member).  
 
“the opposition was such that they [politicians] could see how support for the 
national park would lose them votes but wouldn’t gain them anything, so even if they 
felt themselves favourably disposed towards it they took the pragmatic view that I’m 
just going to have to wind my neck in on this” (Conservationist). 
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Government was therefore reluctant to implement what would be a locally unpopular policy 
and rather than address the issue(s), simply chose not to respond to the report.  One Northern 
Ireland Assembly member’s (MLA) response to the MNPWP consultation read:  
‘Mr. Bradley [an MLA in South Down] does not want to be seen as being supportive 
although he does not state that he is opposed to the proposal’ (Inform 
Communications, 2008: 78).   
This statement typifies the hesitancy amongst some local politicians and the reluctance to 
appear publicly supportive.   
 
Devolution initially (1999) then had a positive influence in terms of progressing the Mourne 
national park policy.  The responsiveness of the devolved Environment Minister to local 
lobbying by local conservationists was influential (Bell and Stockdale, 2015a), however, the 
enhanced local accountability associated with devolved governing latterly resulted in political 
hesitancy (after 2007) in the face of local opposition and thus stalled national park 
progression.   
 
A fundamental question emerges concerning political representation within a devolved 
Northern Ireland and the balance given to local and regional interests.  Should politicians 
simply reflect the views of local people and risk being accused of lacking leadership and 
foresight: “They (MLA’s) were led rather than doing the leading” (Conservationist).  
Conversely, should politicians be prepared to set aside concerns about losing local votes to 
take regionally important decisions?  Margaret Ritchie, MP for the area, revealed that she was 
not prepared to provide strategic leadership for a Mourne national park: “I will be very much 
guided by the outcome of that consultation but more importantly I will be guided by the 
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[local] views of the people of the Mournes” (Mourne Observer, 2011: 29).  Warren (2009: 
208) posed the following question: ‘should the legitimate self-interest of the people of one 
region determine the fate of a national asset of international significance?’  From the outset 
(2002), unlike Scotland, the ‘national’ park issue in Northern Ireland has been discussed and 
debated at primarily the local level (i.e. within the Mournes).  The Mourne national park 
exemplifies how a policy agenda of potentially regional (and local) economic and 
environmental significance is being, and potentially will continue to be, thwarted by an 
element of local opposition.  Donnon and Wilson (1994: 2) observed: ‘[local communities] 
are often major change agents in socio-political processes of significance to many people 
beyond their locality and even beyond their state’.  In the case of the Mournes, particular 
individuals within the community became major ‘anti-change agents’ resulting in an outcome 
which has significance to many people within and beyond the Mournes locality.   
 
Out of recognition of the complex access issues which were illuminated during the Mourne 
consultation, the Environment Minister allocated £500,000 to improve access arrangements 
in the Mournes (DoE, 2007).  Interviews suggest that there was considerable conjecture 
within the community about who and what this money was for.  While one interviewee 
viewed this funding as “direct assistance to landowners and farmers in the area” another 
saw it as a “concession to the conservationists because they weren’t getting their national 
park”.  Either way, only £273,934 of the funding allocated for access improvement was spent 
with minimal uptake from landowners. With landowners in the Mournes still exercising 
considerable control over access, the provision of access improvement grants became 
engulfed in landowner concerns relating to power and private control of land:  
“Landowners turned the money down; they felt their control of the mountain was 
being undermined by improved access” (Conservationist).   
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 “A lotta farmers immediately thought, she’s [Environment Minister] putting this 
money in to get new roads, gates and laneways into the mountains so she can tell 
everyone to come and walk the mountains. And people really got their backsides up 
and then they didn’t want it...I actually drew up a plan for fencing and a car park but 
I couldn’t get a Trustee to sign the application form…he was afraid if we took money 
that they [government] would take control of the mountain” (Mourne farmer).   
 
The issue of access and the protection of private landowner interests emphasises the ongoing 
struggle for power and control in the Mournes. The thoughts of Parker (2008: 145) are 
applicable in the Northern Irish context:  
‘property rights have become so entrenched and symbolic of personal freedom in 
many societies that efforts to re-organise or effect these, and the value that attaches to 
them, are typically met with fierce opposition’.   
 
Current Northern Ireland public access and land ownership arrangements afford private 
landowners considerable influence and power in determining the future success of a Mourne 
national park.  Therefore, the importance of gaining the support of private landowners may 
go some way towards explaining why the national park debate in Northern Ireland has been 
predominantly concentrated at the local level.  
 
 
Conclusion 
There has been much debate concerning the extent to which collaborative processes can 
achieve consensus, generate trust, neutralise conflict and equalise power differentials 
amongst actors with deeply opposing beliefs (Warner, 1997; Sidaway, 1998; Margerum, 
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2002; Healey, 2003; Innes, 2004).  However, there is little evidence that any of the above 
factors materialised through the Northern Ireland national park consultation process as 
tensions were fuelled and diverging participant views became further entrenched.   
 
If (as in Scotland) the first step had been to consult widely across Northern Ireland (through a 
national consultation exercise) to inform the drafting of primary legislation, a site specific 
designation (for example, in the Mournes) could have been pursued with a clearer 
understanding of possible national park structures and powers (aims, management structures, 
planning functions).  As a result of this structural flaw, MNPWP members reported feeling 
helpless at their inability to answer questions during public meetings and local stakeholders 
revealed their frustration at the lack of information and answers to questions.  This legislative 
context shaped the discourse taking place (or not taking place) in the public meeting arena 
which had direct implications for the inclusiveness of the consultation process.  A resulting 
fear of the unknown and perceived national park restrictions saw an anti-national park 
campaign escalate and result in reduced involvement from the local community.  The 
powerful role of the media in shaping public views in the Mournes was also apparent.  
Through circulating information and reporting the views of certain local interests, the local 
media contributed to reproducing and maintaining local uncertainty and doubt and 
accordingly reinforced the power of local elites (namely landowners).   
 
Aided by Lukes' (1974; 2005) framework, which facilitated a broad appreciation of the 
diverse and subtle ways in which power can effect participatory governance, this paper has 
demonstrated how power can manifest at different stages of the policy making process.  
Firstly, those who initiate the process exercise considerable influence in determining the 
parameters of the discussion, including the issues to be addressed, who to include and what 
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format the consultation should take.  The influence of government (power in the second 
dimension) was apparent in confining the national park debate to the Mourne locality, 
appointing members of the MNPWP, establishing the parameters for participatory methods 
employed and setting the MNPWP agenda.   
 
Secondly, as the process is opened up for deliberation, micro-level power differentials can 
constrain participation and determine the expression of stakeholder interests within the 
partnership structure.  The internal dynamics between MNPWP members exemplifies the 
difficulty associated with using a superimposed partnership, comprising diverse interests, to 
report the views of the local community.  The partnership manager (chairman) was deemed to 
have exerted a controlling influence by limiting the involvement of some actors, privileging 
particular viewpoints, engaging in backstage negotiations and publicly announcing that he 
supported the introduction of a Mourne national park.   
 
Thirdly, reporting the outcome of participatory processes constitutes an exercise of power, as 
those responsible can determine the level of consideration given to particular interests.  By 
the end of the process the Mourne Trustees’ perception of the consultation varied 
significantly from the narrative being developed in the MNPWP report which resulted in their 
resignation; perhaps this is the type of conflict government sought to avoid by initially 
excluding the Trustees.  The level of disillusionment and opposition within the Mourne 
Trustees (Mourne Trustees, 2010) now represents a direct obstacle to any future designation 
of a Mourne national park.   
 
Finally, decision makers (often government and politicians) retain the power to decide the 
relative weight given to those issues raised during consultation.  Powerful actors at the micro-
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level in the Mournes (the no national park lobby) directly influenced subsequent stages of the 
governing process as the Minister appeared reluctant to progress a Mourne national park 
amidst strong and vocal anti-national park sentiment.  On the one hand, this could be viewed 
as more responsive governing, whereby the Minister chose not to impose an unsupported 
policy proposal.  On the other hand, the Minister could be accused of procrastination and 
hesitancy for failing to offer a clear stance or leadership on the issue.   
 
While the Mournes example demonstrates the influence of local and private landowning 
interests in determining the future management of the area, the inability to take forward the 
national parks policy agenda is perhaps symptomatic of a wider issue; the failings of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly as an effective legislative making body.  Margaret Ritchie (MP 
for the area) acknowledged at interview that the failure to introduce national parks legislation 
possibly reflects the reality of firstly, a political system which prioritises local issues at the 
expense of wider regional issues and secondly, a body of elected representatives who are 
heavily influenced by very parochial interests:  
“Politics here is local and people will be guided by not only the socio-economic 
aspect but by the views of those local people. I don’t think perhaps we are mature 
enough yet as a democracy to put aside the very localised interests…I think that is 
perhaps one of the indications coming from the fact we haven’t got this [national 
park] legislation” (Margaret Ritchie).   
 
The future progression of national parks in Northern Ireland could depend on the level of 
political leadership and the ability of politicians at all levels to successfully negotiate between 
local and regional interests and public and personal (future votes) interests.  Due to apparent 
opposition amongst some local stakeholders the present Environment Minister is not 
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currently minded to progress national parks legislation (BBC, 2014).  The Mourne national 
park consultation process has demonstrated tensions between local and regional/national 
interests, the ongoing power differentials in decision making and the immaturity of recently 
devolved government in Northern Ireland.  This does not bode well as Northern Ireland 
embarks on the next phase of decentralised governance: namely the return of planning 
powers to local government in Northern Ireland (under a reform of public administration 
(Knox, 2012)) which gives locally elected representatives (local councilors) a more 
significant role in determining planning applications.  At a time when a more strategic, long-
term vision is required to guide policy and decision making around land management in 
Northern Ireland, decisions could be about to become further politicised and orientated 
towards serving local and private individual interests at the expense of the wider public 
interest (if the experiences of the national park policy attempt are repeated).   
 
Local authorities are often deemed to be disproportionately focussed on facilitating economic 
development at the expense of the environment (Illsley and Richardson, 2004).  If Northern 
Ireland’s internationally significant landscapes continue to suffer from a lack of strategic 
planning, management and protection, this vital resource upon which the future prosperity 
and well-being of society (both local and regional) depends, could be undermined by the 
pursuit of short-term economic development goals (Bell and Stockdale, 2015b).  Given the 
lack of statutory management powers for AONB management bodies and the minimal 
planning protection afforded AONB’s in Northern Ireland compared to the rest of the UK, 
councils have assumed planning responsibilities without a comprehensive regional 
framework for landscape management and protection. With no immediate prospects of 
enhanced landscape designations and management arrangements, a holistic approach to 
community planning is required which values the multiple benefits of Northern Ireland’s 
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landscapes (e.g. recreation, health, tourism), recognises the cumulative impact of 
development and the impact that local planning decisions have beyond one particular locality.  
Furthermore, a policy instrument, such as a land use or landscape strategy, modelled around 
the National Landscape Strategy in Ireland (Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, 
2015) or the Scottish Land Use Strategy (Scottish Government, 2011), would assist by 
articulating a strategic vision and set of overarching principles to more effectively guide and 
influence decision making at local level.  As in Scotland, this policy could be complemented 
by local authority led land use strategy pilot projects (Scottish Government, 2011) which 
offer innovative approaches to land use decision-making and provide practical solutions to 
managing the multitude of pressures on land. 
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